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Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi

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The issue which concern all of us as citizens of this country, irrespective of our political beliefs and ethnicity, is this: if we are to forbear all legal proceedings against the perpetrators of the events of 19 May 2000 what does that say about our sense of right and wrong? What does it say to those that were directly and indirectly harmed by their actions? Without an accounting, we encourage repetition of this conduct, make light of the pain and suffering people endured and suggest to the impressionable that such conduct is appropriate.
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Our Country at the Crossroads - 2001 Parkinson Memorial Lecture Series, 15 August 2001

 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi

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