Semyon Timoshenko (1895 – 1970)
Soviet military commander and senior professional officer of the Red Army at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
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The Red Army must keep its powder dry and be in constant mobilization and preparedness.
It is necessary to keep in mind the possibility of simultaneously conducting two, if not three, offensive operations of various fronts on a theater of war with the intention of strategically shaking the enemy's entire combat capability as extensively as possible.
We have fine troops, they are inured.
No actions are to be taken against the Germans without our consent.
It is possible that the Germans will attack, and it is necessary that the fleet be in readiness.
We are harassing them and will go on harassing them until they are totally exhausted. This is not merely tactics of a definite kind—it is a strategy with a broad perspective, directed at definitive and total victory. The Russian defence always had preparation for the counter-offensive as its aim. The Russian war plan here follows the commandmant of Clausewitz, "Swift and powerful transition to the attack—the lightning sword of retribution — that is the most brilliant part of the defense.
We intend to check up on the fitness of our small units...If each such particle attains real efficiency and brings genuine military skill to our large units, our troops, should they be called upon to fight, will carry out their operations without sustaining heavy losses.
Peoples of all the warring countries are trying to put an end to the war, to establish peace. And we believe that they will get peace. And the sooner they get peace the better.
We'll spin them out like a bobbin thread.
The Russians have learned much in this hard war in which the Finns fought with heroism.
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